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(Marshall, 1., dissenting). Noting 
that the only change in the four year 
interim between the decisions in 
Booth and Gathers and Payne was 
the personnel ofthe Court, Marshall 
maintained that the real inquiry 
should be whether the majority sat-
isfied the extraordinary showing of 
special justification required before 
overruling Court precedent. [d. at 
2619-21. 
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined 
by Justice Blackmun, emphasized 
that our capital punishment juris-
prudence has allowed the sentenc-
ing jury to consider only mitigating 
evidence concerning the offense and 
the character of the defendant. [d. at 
2626-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens asserted that evi-
dence which served no purpose other 
than appealing to the "sympathies 
or emotions of the jurors has never 
been considered admissible." [d. at 
2626. The dissent accused the ma-
jority of abandoning the "rules of 
relevance that are older than the 
Nation itself." [d. at 2627. 
With this decision, the Supreme 
Court has overruled recently de-
cided cases and disregarded prece-
dent by holding victim impact evi-
dence constitutionally permissible. 
A state may now allow a sentencing 
jury to consider victim impact evi-
dence, and a prosecutor may argue 
victim impactto the sentencingjury. 
The Court's broad interpretation of 
"relevant evidence" will have far 
reaching implications for capital 
defendants, the families oftheir vic-
tims, and to society as a whole. 
- Belinda P. Gardner 
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Rust v. Sullivan: SUPREME 
COURT UPHOLDS AGENCY 
REGULATIONS PROHIBIT-
ING THE COUNSELING, 
REFERRAL OR PROVISION 
OF INFORMATION CON-
CERNING ABORTION AS A 
METHOD OF FAMILY PLAN-
NING. 
In a five to four decision, the 
Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan, 
III S. Ct. 1759 (1991), upheldregu-
lations of the Public Health Ser-
vices Act requiring recipients oITitie 
X funds to refrain from engaging in 
abortion counseling, referral, and 
provision of information concern-
ing abortion as a method of family 
planning. The Court gave extreme 
deference to the Department of 
Health and Human Services and 
upheld the regulations on the ground 
of statutory construction. In addi-
tion, the Court found the regula-
tions were not violative ofthe First 
or Fifth Amendments. 
Title X ofthe Public Health Ser-
vice Act, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 
300a-6), was originally enacted by 
Congress in 1970 to provide federal 
funding for family-planning ser-
vices. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764. The 
Act authorized the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (the 
Secretary) to provide funding to 
public or nonprofit private entities 
to operate family planning projects. 
The Secretary was also authorized 
to promulgate such regulations as 
deemed necessary to carry out the 
intent of the statute. [d. (citing 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300(a), 300a-4 (1970». 
Section 1008 of the Act provided 
that "[n]one of the funds appropri-
ated under this subchapter shall be 
used in programs where abortion is 
a method offamily planning." Rust, 
111 S. Ct. at 1764-65 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970». 
In 1988, after determining that 
current regulations failed to prop-
erly implement the statute, the Sec-
retary promulgated new regulations 
designed to provide "clear and op-
erational guidance to grantees [of 
Title X funds] to preserve the dis-
tinction between Title X programs 
and abortion as a method of family 
planning." Rust, IllS. Ct. at 1765 
(quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-24 
(1988». Specifically, the regula-
tions attached three conditions for 
receipt ofthe funds. First, the ''Title 
X project may not provide counsel-
ing concerning the use of abortion 
as a method of family planning or 
provide referral for abortion as a 
method of family planning." Rust, 
III S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting42C.F.R. 
§ 59.8(a)(I». Second, recipients of 
Title X funds may not engage in 
activities that "encourage, promote 
or advocate abortion as a method of 
family planning." [d. (quoting 42 
C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989». Third, 
the Title X project must be "physi-
cally and financially separate" from 
any prohibited activity so that an 
"objective integrity and indepen-
dence from prohibited activities" 
remains. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765 
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989». 
The petitioners in this action were 
grantees of Title X funds suing on 
behalf of themselves and their pa-
tients. The petitioners challenged 
the facial validity ofthe new regula-
tions on grounds that they were not 
authorized by Title X and violated 
the First and Fifth Amendment rights 
of Title X patients and the First 
Amendment rights of Title X health 
care providers. The District Court 
for the Southern District of New 
York granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Secretary. Both the 
Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit and the Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision. 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court 
first addressed the Secretary's au-
thority to promulgate the regula-
tions, and then reviewed the validity 
ofthe regulations and their constitu-
tional ramifications. The Court 
found the language of section 1008, 
which provided that no Title X funds 
be appropriated where abortion is a 
method of family planning, to be 
ambiguous. Id. at 1767. The Court, 
therefore, reaffirmed the principle 
that if a statute is "silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific is-
sue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the 
statute." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767 
(quoting Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837,842-43 (1984)). 
Accordingly, the Court looked 
to the legislative history of the Act 
for guidance. Finding that the his-
tory did not illuminate the meaning 
of section 1008, the Court held the 
Secretary's interpretation of the 
regulations should be accorded sub-
stantial deference, and, thus, such 
interpretation was apermissible con-
struction of the statute. Id. at 1768. 
In so doing, the Court rejected peti-
tioners arguments that deference was 
improper because the agency's 1988 
regulations were in sharp contrast to 
prior regulations of the same stat-
ute. Id. at 1769. The Court stated 
that an agency "must be given ample 
latitude to adapt [its] rules and poli-
cies to the demands of changing 
circumstances." Id (quoting Mo-
tor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass 'n v. State 
Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 42 (1983)). Because the 
Secretary's regulations were based 
on critical reports of the General 
Accounting Office and the Office of 
the Inspector General, as well as a 
"shift in the attitude against the elimi-
nation of unborn children by abor-
tion," the Court found the 1988 
changes were justified. Rust, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1768. 
The petitioners also challenged 
the "program integrity" requirement 
ofthe regulations on the ground that 
it frustrated the expressed intent of 
Congress that Title X programs be 
an integral part of a ''broader, com-
prehensive, health-care system." Id. 
The Court again found the legisla-
tive history to be lacking, and af-
forded great deference to the Secre-
tary in finding the regulation per-
missible. Id. at 1770. 
Turning to the constitutional 
ramifications ofthe regulations, the 
Court held that while the constitu-
tional arguments were not without 
force, ''they do not carry the day." 
Id. at 1771. The Court found sec-
tion 1008 did not violate the First 
Amendment, because the govern-
ment may "make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion, 
and ... implement that judgment by 
the allocation of public funds." Id. 
at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S. 464,474 (1977)). 
In addition, forbidding the coun-
seling, referral, and provision of 
abortion information is constitu-
tional as these provisions ensure 
that the ambit of Title X remains 
within the limited scope of provid-
ing services for family planning. 
"When the government appropri-
ates public funds to establish a pro-
gram it is entitled to define the lim-
its of that program." Rust, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1773. 
Finally, the Court held that al-
though the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship is entitled to greater 
First Amendment protection, even 
when subsidized by the government, 
the 1988 regulations did not seri-
ously impinge on that relationship. 
The Court emphasized that since the 
Title X program does not provide 
post-conception care, "a doctor's 
silence with regard to abortion can-
not reasonably be thought to mis-
lead a client into thinking that the 
doctor does not consider abortion an 
appropriate option for her." Id. at 
1776. 
Moreover, the Court held that 
the regulations did not violate a 
woman's Fifth Amendment right to 
choose whether to terminate her 
pregnancy. Reaffirming the prin-
ciple set forth in Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, the Court 
stated that ''the Due Process Clauses 
generally confer no affirmative right 
to governmental aid, even where 
such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests of 
which the government itself may 
not deprive the individual." Rust, 
111 S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting Webster 
v. ReproductiveHealthServices, 109 
S.Ct. 3040 (1989)). 
In justifying this principle, the 
Court stated that the government, 
by choosing not to fund abortion 
services, is leaving women in the 
same position as if it had decided 
not to provide any family planning 
services at all. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 
1777. Because the regulations in no 
way impede a woman's right to 
receive an abortion or a doctor's 
right to provide abortion related in-
formation and services outside the 
TitleX context, the regulations were 
found constitutional. Id. 
In a strong dissent joined by 
Justices Marshall, O'Connor, and 
Stevens in part, Justice Blackmun 
argued that the constitutional issues 
should not have been reached. In his 
opinion, the Secretary exceeded his 
statutory authority by promUlgating 
the regulations. Id. at 1778 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice 
Blackmun charged the majority with 
failing to adhere to the cannon that 
federal statutes must be construed 
so as to avoid "serious doubt of their 
constitutionality." Id. Because the 
regulations raised serious questions 
of First and Fifth Amendment rights, 
Justice Blackmun believed they 
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should have been struck down on 
the grounds of constitutional con-
struction. Id. at 1779. 
Justice Blackmun next addressed 
the constitutional issues ofthe case, 
because he strongly disagreed with 
the disposition of the majority. In 
his opinion, the regulations imposed 
viewpoint based restrictions on the 
protected speech between a doctor 
and his patient, and, thus, unconsti-
tutionally impeded a woman's abil-
ity to obtain abortion related ser-
vices. Id. at 1784-85. Commenting 
on the majority's opinion, Justice 
Blackmun stated that "[t]his is a 
course nearly as noxious as overrul-
ing Roe directly, for if a right is 
found to be unenforceable, even 
against flagrant attempts by the gov-
ernment to circumvent it, then it 
ceases to be a right at all." Id. at 
1786. 
The majority opinion in Rust v. 
Sullivan, takes the Court one step 
closer to overruling Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and makes it 
nearly impossible for indigent 
women to gain access to abortion 
information and services. While the 
government may be under no obli-
gation to provide such services, it 
has an obligation to continue them 
once provided. In addition, this 
Court upheld a governmental regu-
lation that denies women full access 
to medical information, thereby en-
dangering and jeopardizing both 
their life and lifestyle. The Court's 
decision makes it nearly impossible 
for physicians receiving Title X 
funds to fulfill their Hippocratic oath, 
as they are banned from informing a 
patient of all safe options concern-
ing her pregnancy. 
- Laura Melia 
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FALL "A.M. LAW" SEMINAR SERIES CONCLUDES 
This year's Hyman and Isidore Ginsberg" A.M. Law" Seminar Series concludes on November 17 
with a presentation by University of Baltimore Professors Anne Pecora and Jean Tullius, entitled 
"Securing and Safeguarding Seniors' Rights: An Overview of Elder Law." The seminar begins at 7 :45 
a.m. and takes place in the Moot Court Room located on the first level of the Law School. This seminar 
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2726. The spring "A.M. Law" series will continue on February 16, 1993. 
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